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STUDENT NOTES

LOCAL OPTION-EFFECT
OF ELECTION IN COUNTY UPON
PRIOR ELECTION HELD IN MUNICIPALITY WITHIN
THE COUNTY.
Perhaps the most important problem connected with the question
of local option pertains to the territory affected by a vote held under
the authority conferred by our constitution and statutes. The importance of this problem results from the fact that the voting units,
usually counties, often contain smaller divisions which are opposed to
the result reached in the unit as a whole. Thus, a "dry" county may
contain a "wet" town, or a "wet" county may embrace a "dry" town.
As a general rule, our urban population is more prone to vote against
prohibition than is the rural population; and it is this phase of the
problem which will be dealt with here. The question, then, is: May
a town or city remain "wet", although the county in which it is
situated has adopted the local option law?
The Kentucky Constitution provides:
"The General Assembly shall by general law provide a means
whereby the sense of the people of any county, city, town, district
or precinct may be taken as to whether or -not spirituous, vinous
or malt liquor shall be sold, bartered or loaned therein, or the sale
thereof regulated. Nothing herein shall be construed to interfere
with or to repeal any law in force relating to the sale or gift of
such liquors. All elections on the question may be held on a day
other than regular election days."'
The pertinent statutes are:
"Upon application by a written petition filed with the clerk of the
county court of any county signed by the number of legal voters
in said county, or any city, town, district or precinct thereof to
be affected, equal to twenty-five (25) per cent of the votes cast
In said territory at the last preceding general election, it shall
be the duty of the judge of the county court of such county at the
current or the next regular term of said court thereafter to make
an order on the order book of said court directing an election to
be held in such county, city, town, district or precinct to be affected
thereby, for the purpose of taking the sense of the legal voters
of such county, city, town, district or precinct upon the proposition whether or not spirituous,
vinous, or malt liquor shall be sold,
bartered, or loaned therein."2
Additional statutes concerning the problem at hand provide:
"No election in any territory less than the county shall be held on the
same day on which an election for the entire county is held"' and "No
election shall be held in the same territory oftener than once in every
three years."'
Although there may be some doubt in view of the statutes alone,
the cases are clear that where a county votes in favor of local option,
a city within this county may not within three years thereafter vote,
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and the vote of the county as a whole will control within the city.5
This conclusion is a logical interpretation of the phrase "in the same
territory" as used in the above statute, and therefore fault may not
be found with it. Thus is precluded the right of the municipality to
hold an election subsequent to one in the entire county, and thus is
prevented one possibility of a "wet" town in a "dry" county.
There is an express prohibition in the statutes relative to simultaneous elections in county and city. As above set forth, it is specifically provided: "No election in any territory less than the county
shall be held on the same day on which an election for the entire
county is held."5
But one possibility remains. If a municipality votes against
"local option", will the force of this election withstand a subsequent
vote in favor of "local option" in the entire county? In this regard,
the statutes are not explicit, and we must turn to judicial decisions
and other considerations for the answer. It is conceivable that the
statutory prohibition against succeeding elections within the same
territory within three years of each other together with the decisions
holding that an attempted vote In a subdivision of a county within
three years from the time when the entire county had held an election
was an election within the same territory and therefore prohibited T
would point to the logical converse conclusion that where a town has
voted "wet", a subsequent vote for local option in the entire county
would not be operative within the "wet" town, if the elections were
held within three years of each other. Notwithstanding that this is
the logical conclusion, there is some doubt as to whether it is the law
in Kentucky.
Where the result of the election in the smaller division has been
in favor of prohibition, a subsequent election in the larger division
within three years resulting against prohibition has been held to
have no effect upon the status of the territory involved In the first
election.8 However, where the election in the smaller division terminated in a "wet" result, a subsequent election in the entire county
favoring the adoption of local option was held to nullify the effect of
the prior election,9 but the statutes in effect at that time and under
which the elections were held permitted cities of the first four classes
to vote in a separate election upon the same day as the county election, and since the "wet" town, Georgetown, was a fourth class city,11
and did not, by calling a simultaneous and separate election on the
same day, signify its intention to remain wet, it was held to have been
controlled by the result in the election of wider scope. Under the
present statutes, not only is the provision for simultaneous election
5
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absent, but in addition there is an express prohibition against this
very thing." Since this city could have remained "wet" by holding
a simultaneous election, and since the provision for a simultaneous
election was omitted from and prohibited by the present statute, there
is a strong indication that the Legislature intended the prior election
to control.
Perhaps the strongest authority for the proposition that a subsequent election in the county would supersede one held in a city located
therein Is the case of The Trustees of the Town of Yew Castle v.
Scott.2 In that case, New Castle, a fifth class city, had voted "wet".
Within three years thereafter, the entire county voted "dry". Since
New Castle was not one of the first four classes of cities, the statute
did not allow it a simultaneous vote, and it was not therefore guilty
of "sleeping on its rights" as was Georgetown in the above discussed
case. It was, nevertheless, held that the county election would control. In that opinion it was said: "Each local unit should have the
privilege of saying conclusively that prohibition should prevail, but
not conclusively that it should not." This proposition was based upon
several considerations. One of these was that the section of the Constitution authorizing the Local Option Statutes stated specifically:
"Nothing herein shall be construed to interfere with or to repeal any
law in force relating to the sale or gift of such liquor", thus referring
to the special acts of Local Option in effect in various districts
throughout the state prior to the passage of the uniform Local Option
Statutes." This constitutional provision precluded the possibility of
holding that subsequent "wet" vote in a county would supersede a
"dry" vote in a part of the county, and thus laid the foundation for
the first part of the proposition quoted above. That part setting forth
that a unit smaller than a county could not conclusively say that
prohibition should not prevail was based upon the theory that
the county, and not the town or city, is historically and actually the
true unit of government. However, the reasoning employed to sustain this theory involved a comparison of the county and a precinct
thereof. While it is true that a precinct could hardly be said to be a
more complete governmental unit than the county, yet by the standards of 1937 the town or city more nearly conforms to this requisite
than does the county. If either the town or the county is to be given
preference as being the more complete in governmental function, the
former merits the choice. Since the matter has not been decided
under our present statutes, and since the better reasoning seems to
favor a result contrary to that reached in the case under discussion,
it Is submitted that should a municipality vote against Local Option,
a subsequent vote by its county within three years favoring Local
Option would have no effect upon the municipality.
SAM MILIM.
Stat. (Carroll, 1936), Sec. 2554c-4-c.
'30 K. L. R. 894, 101 S. W. 944 (1907).
13Ky. Const., § 61.
1Ky.

